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A Better Act, More Bad Behaviour Online: Nova
Scotia’s New Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act
Goes to Court
Jennifer Taylor*

1. INTRODUCTION
There is now a reported decision under Nova Scotia’s new Intimate Images
and Cyber-protection Act,1 which came into force in July 2018 after the previous
legislation, the Cyber-safety Act,2 was struck down as unconstitutional.3
The case, Candelora v. Feser,4 was set against the backdrop of a bitter family
law dispute. Dawna Candelora (the Applicant), alleged that her former spouse
Trevor Feser and his new partner Sonia Dadas (the Respondents) were cyberbullying her through an unrelenting stream of negative Facebook posts.
Justice Joshua Arnold of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia found that the
Respondents had engaged in cyber-bullying and issued an order requiring them
to, among other things, remove the offending Facebook posts.
Before discussing the case in more detail, this commentary will first look at
the Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act to see if it solves some of the
problems of the Cyber-safety Act. The concluding section will discuss what the
New Act means for access to justice for people harmed by online expression.

Part I: The Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act
The purpose of the Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act is set out in
section 2:
2 The purpose of this Act is to
(a) create civil remedies to deter, prevent and respond to the harms of nonconsensual sharing of intimate images and cyber-bullying;
(b) uphold and protect the fundamental freedoms of thought, belief,
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
communication; and
(c) provide assistance to Nova Scotians in responding to nonconsensual
sharing of intimate images and cyber-bullying.
The legislation has a broader goal than the Cyber-safety Act, addressing not only
cyber-bullying but also ‘‘the non-consensual sharing of intimate images.”
*
1
2

3
4

Jennifer Taylor is a lawyer at Stewart McKelvey in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
Intimate Images and Cyber-Protection Act, S.N.S. 2017, c. 7 [Act or New Act].
Cyber-safety Act, S.N.S. 2013, c. 2 [Former Act], formally repealed by section 16(1) of the
New Act.
Crouch v. Snell, 2015 NSSC 340, 2015 CarswellNS 995 (N.S. S.C.).
Candelora v. Feser, 2019 NSSC 370, 2019 CarswellNS 905 (N.S. S.C.).
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Practically, it makes sense to target both kinds of online misconduct (which may
happen together) in the same legislation. More broadly, the Legislature should be
commended for providing a legal mechanism for victims of non-consensual
image distribution (sometimes crassly, and inappropriately, called ‘‘revenge
porn”) to seek recourse.
The Act defines ‘‘cyber-bullying” in section 3(c), as:
an electronic communication, direct or indirect, that causes or is likely
to cause harm to another individual’s health or well-being where the
person responsible for the communication maliciously intended to
cause harm to another individual’s health or wellbeing or was reckless
with regard to the risk of harm to another individual’s health or wellbeing[.]

The subsection then lists examples of what may constitute cyber-bullying:
(i) creating a web page, blog or profile in which the creator assumes the
identity of another person,
(ii) impersonating another person as the author of content or a
message,
(iii) disclosure of sensitive personal facts or breach of confidence,
(iv) threats, intimidation or menacing conduct,
(v) communications that are grossly offensive, indecent, or obscene,
(vi) communications that are harassment,
(vii) making a false allegation,
(viii) communications that incite or encourage another person to
commit suicide,
(ix) communications that denigrate another person because of any
prohibited ground of discrimination listed in Section 5 of the Human
Rights Act, or
(x) communications that incite or encourage another person to do any
of the foregoing.

Subsection (f) defines ‘‘intimate image” to include ‘‘a photograph, film or video
recording”:
(i) in which a person depicted in the image is nude, is exposing the
person’s genital organs, anal region or her breasts, or is engaged in
explicit sexual activity,
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(ii) that was recorded in circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable
expectation of privacy in respect of the image, and
(iii) where the image has been distributed, in which the person depicted
in the image retained a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time it
was distributed[.]

Section 5 of the Act allows a person ‘‘whose intimate image was distributed
without consent or who is or was the victim of cyber-bullying” to ‘‘apply to the
Court for an order under Section 6.” (Note that ‘‘Court” is defined as the
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia — unlike the Former Act, proceedings under the
New Act do not go before a justice of the peace.)
Section 6 provides for two types of orders.
Section 6(2) applies where it is clear that cyber-bullying or non-consensual
image distribution has occurred, but it is unclear who is responsible. This
provision allows the Court to ‘‘order any person” (likely an internet service
provider, web hosting service, or social media company) to provide the applicant
with information that may help identify who is responsible, such as an IP address
or other electronic identifiers; ‘‘take down or disable access to an intimate image
or cyber-bullying communication”; or take other ‘‘just and reasonable” action.
Section 6(1) outlines the Court’s powers where it is ‘‘satisfied that a person has
engaged in cyber-bullying or has distributed an intimate image without consent.”
This is the remedial meat of the legislation.
The Court may simply make an order ‘‘declaring that an image is an intimate
image” or ‘‘a communication is cyber-bullying”, which could offer a meaningful
sense of vindication to the victim. Beyond these declaratory orders, the court
may (inter alia) issue an order prohibiting the person responsible from
distributing the intimate image or ‘‘making communications that would be
cyber-bullying”; prohibiting the person from contacting the applicant; and/or
‘‘requiring the person to take down or disable access to an intimate image or
communication.”
Section 6(7) lists multiple factors for the Court to consider before making a
remedial order, including the content of the image or communication at issue; the
age and vulnerability of the victim; the age and maturity of the person
responsible; the purpose or intention of the person responsible; and the context
and extent of the distribution or communication. (Perhaps redundantly, the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is one of the listed factors for the Court to
consider.)
In a 2016 article for this journal,5 the author suggested several ways a new
statute could address the problems with the Cyber-safety Act — which Justice
McDougall described in Crouch v. Snell as a ‘‘colossal failure” for its overly
broad definition of cyber-bullying and its unfair procedures 6 — while still
providing redress for victims of harmful online speech.7
5

Jennifer Taylor, ‘‘Minding the Gap: Why and How Nova Scotia Should Enact a New
Cyber-safety Act” (2016) 14:1 C.J.L.T. 157.
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These included suggestions that any new statute should explicitly limit the
definition of cyber-bullying to harmful communications; require the applicant to
prove they had suffered harm as a result of the communications; specify that the
person responsible must have intended to cause harm; and provide for defences.
The New Act stacks up relatively well when measured against these proposals.
The definition of ‘‘cyber-bullying” is now limited to a communication that
‘‘causes or is likely to cause harm to another individual’s health or well-being.” A
pattern of communication is not required; the Act accepts that a single activity
(like ‘‘creating a web page, blog or profile in which the creator assumes the
identity of another person”)8 can rise to the level of cyber-bullying. That said,
‘‘the extent of the distribution of the intimate image or cyber-bullying” is a factor
for the Court to consider under section 6(7).
The definition of cyber-bullying has a built-in mental element: the person
responsible must have ‘‘maliciously intended to cause harm to another
individual’s health or well-being” or been ‘‘reckless with regard to the risk of
harm to another individual’s health or well-being.” There is also a similar mental
element required to prove that someone has distributed an intimate image
without consent: the definition of ‘‘distribute without consent” means the
distributor must have known that ‘‘the person in the image did not consent to the
distribution” or acted recklessly in that regard.9
The applicant does not necessarily have to prove they have suffered harm,
but ‘‘the nature and extent of the harm caused” is on the list of factors that may
be relevant when the court is determining whether to make an order under
section 6.10
Finally, the New Act includes several defences, in section 7. It is a defence if
the respondent can show that the distribution of the image or the communication
was ‘‘in the public interest,” or made with the victim’s (express or implied)
consent. It is also a defence if the respondent is a peace officer or public officer,
and the distribution or communication was necessary to fulfill their duties.
Lastly, subsection 7(2)(b) incorporates several defences from the law of
defamation, including fair comment, responsible journalism, and privilege.

Part II: The Case of Candelora v. Feser
The impetus for the Former Act was the Rehteah Parsons tragedy in 2013.
Parsons died at 17 following a suicide attempt, after a photo of her being sexually
assaulted was repeatedly shared online among her high school peers.11
6
7
8
9
10
11

Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at para. 165.
Taylor, supra note 5 at 167-168.
New Act, supra note 1 at s. 3(c)(i).
New Act, supra note 1 at s. 3(d).
Ibid at s. 6(7)(c).
Elizabeth Chiu, ‘‘The Legacy of Rehteah Parsons” CBC (6 April 2018), online: <https://
newsinteractives.cbc.ca/longform/five-years-gone>.
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In light of these tragic circumstances, it seemed a bit strange when the first
case litigated under the Former Act involved a dispute between former business
partners, both adult men.
The parties in Candelora, the first case decided under the New Act, were all
adults, too.
The Applicant (Ms. Candelora) and Mr. Feser (one of the Respondents)
were ‘‘in the midst of protracted proceedings in the Family Division regarding
custody, access and child support” following the dissolution of their 11-year
marriage. Mr. Feser was living in Alberta with the other Respondent, his new
partner Ms. Dadas.
The online turmoil apparently began in the summer of 2018, when ‘‘Ms.
Candelora called Ms. Dadas a ‘prostitute’” during a custody exchange. Shortly
thereafter (and you can’t make this stuff up), Ms. Candelora learned that ‘‘Ms.
Dadas actually might be a sex trade worker, under the alias of Sophie French.”
This issue was a common theme in the impugned Facebook posts, but Justice
Arnold made clear that he did ‘‘not need to make a ruling as to whether Ms.
Dadas is actually involved in the sex trade” as the parties asked him to ignore
anything in the materials on this issue.12
The parties filed several affidavits between them (including five from the
Applicant). All three testified at the hearing. Almost 50 pages of Justice Arnold’s
75-page decision are taken up with excerpts from the evidence, including many of
the objectionable Facebook posts (which were either public, or available to Ms.
Dada’s almost 5,000 Facebook friends) and a negative review that Ms. Dadas left
on the website of Remax, Ms. Candelora’s employer.
A representative post by Ms. Dadas: ‘‘You should’ve never [f*cked] with me
Dawna[.] Your whole affidavit is a pack of lies just like your 11 year marriage.
Expose all!”
Ms. Dadas and Mr. Feser evidently wanted their Facebook ‘‘friends” to take
their side in the ongoing family law proceedings, the developments of which were
described in their posts.13
The Applicant and her lawyer repeatedly asked the Respondents to remove
the postings, to no avail.
The Applicant also acknowledged sending her affidavit from this proceeding
to Frank magazine after the magazine inquired about the Applicant’s arrest. (It
appears the Applicant was charged with uttering threats against Mr. Feser, but
the underlying circumstances are unclear and, in any event, this did not seem to
affect Justice Arnold’s decision.)
This case did not involve a constitutional challenge to the New Act, as Justice
Arnold noted.14 Justice Arnold’s task was to consider the abundance of evidence

12
13
14

Candelora at para. 5.
See e.g. Candelora v. Feser, supra note 4 at para. 55.
Ibid at para. 41.
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and determine whether the communications constituted cyber-bullying15 and, if
so, to make an appropriate order.
The communications were found to meet the definition of cyber-bullying: 16
.
.

.
.

.

.
.

Facebook posts are ‘‘electronic communications”;
the posts involved public communications about the Applicant — even
though the Applicant was ‘‘blocked” from directly accessing the
Respondents’ Facebook pages, the Court found the Respondents intended
the Applicant and her lawyer to see them;
the Applicant experienced harm, namely ‘‘significant psychological stress”
which impacted her physical health;
the Respondents had the requisite malicious intent (or recklessness), in
trying ‘‘to dissuade Ms. Candelora from pursuing the proper course of
litigation through repeated venomous postings . . . The whole point of
those postings was to bully Ms. Candelora so that she would feel
psychologically pressured into reversing her legal position”;
the Respondents shared personal information, including the Applicant’s
tax returns and other financial information, ‘‘in an effort to embarrass and
humiliate her”;
the Respondents used ‘‘offensive and degrading” language; and
the communications were a form of harassment.

In the result, the Court was satisfied that the Respondents ‘‘engaged in
cyber-bullying as defined in s. 3(c) of the Act.”17
Many of the same factors informed Justice Arnold’s consideration of
remedy, pursuant to section 6(7). He found that ‘‘Ms. Dadas posted prolifically
about Ms. Candelora” (often based on information fed to her by Mr. Feser), in
an effort to stop ‘‘Ms. Candelora from referencing her belief that Ms. Dadas was
a sex trade worker and to curtail the litigation between Ms. Candelora and Mr.
Feser regarding custody, access, and child support.”18 The distribution of the
posts was ‘‘significant”, given Ms. Dadas’s 4,900 Facebook friends. 19 The
Respondents ‘‘did nothing to minimize harm” to the Applicant. 20
On whether the communications were true or false (one of the factors in
section 6(7)), Justice Arnold stated:
15

16
17
18
19
20

The Former Act created a ‘‘tort” of cyber-bullying. The New Act does not; section 10
explicitly preserves ‘‘any right of action or remedy available to that person under
common law or by statute.” Justice Arnold nevertheless referred to a ‘‘claim under the
Act” (at para. 43; see also para. 46) and ‘‘liability” for cyber-bullying (at paras. 93 and
111).
Candelora v. Feser, supra note 4 at paras. 50-67.
Ibid at para. 67.
Ibid at para. 74.
Ibid at para. 76.
Ibid at para. 79.
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Much of the information posted by the respondents consisted of insults.
Some of the postings referred to personal information about Ms.
Candelora made available to the respondents through the course of
litigation and some postings referred to information made known to
Mr. Feser through his marriage to Ms. Candelora and during the
dissolution of the marriage. Some of the postings may have referenced
truthful information, but were being used to harass and intimidate Ms.
Candelora. Any actual truth or falsity to what was said was only
incidental to the true purpose of the postings.21

Although the Charter was not directly at issue, Justice Arnold was ‘‘mindful that
the allegations should be considered” consistently with freedom of expression as
protected by section 2(b) of the Charter.22 Nevertheless, Justice Arnold rejected
all of the Respondents’ defences, including truth (which is not expressly included
in the Act as a defence)23 and public interest (based on the Applicant’s position
as a realtor).24
The Respondents’ defence of consent, based on the Applicant providing her
affidavit to Frank magazine, was rejected as well:
Section 7(2)(a) of the Act says that a victim[’]s express or implied
consent is a defence to cyber-bullying. The respondents claim that
because Ms. Candelora forwarded an affidavit containing many of the
postings to Frank magazine she implicitly consented to the making of
their communications. While it was nonsensical for Ms. Candelora or
her counsel to forward the respondents’ postings to Frank in these
circumstances (while simultaneously complaining about the public
nature of the respondents’ postings), such ex post facto activity in an
effort to implement some sort of ill-advised damage control strategy did
not provide retroactive implied consent to the postings by Ms. Dadas
or Mr. Feser. The actions of Ms. Candelora or her counsel in this
regard go only to damages.25

As a remedy, Justice Arnold ordered the Respondents to remove all of the
offending communications and prohibited them ‘‘from making any further
communications that would be cyber-bullying” and communicating with Ms.
Candelora ‘‘except through legal counsel or for the purpose of arranging
access.”26

21
22
23
24
25
26

Ibid at paras. 77-78.
Ibid at paras. 84-85.
Ibid at para. 91.
Ibid at para. 96.
Ibid at para. 100.
Ibid at para. 102.
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Ms. Candelora also sought damages, including punitive and aggravated
damages. The Respondents had not made detailed submissions on damages, so
the Court gave them time to do so. A follow-up decision may be forthcoming.

2. CONCLUSION
A case like Candelora could be read as an indictment of today’s social media
landscape and could, perhaps, be seen as a waste of the court’s time.27 But
Candelora can also be read as affirming something profound: that there is access
to justice for victims of harmful online behaviour. Dismissing cases like this as
frivolous would miss the broader point that online abuse can cause real harm,
and those responsible are not entitled to impunity just because their misconduct
happens behind a screen.
In Candelora, the Respondent Ms. Dadas made some telling comments
about what she thought she could get away with online — comments like, ‘‘I will
share my journey under the Canadian charter of rights and freedom”; ‘‘I talk
about my life under the charter of right of expression and people comment on the
post and I can’t control what people say”; and ‘‘I’m actually under the Charter of
Expression, I’m expressing some women, which means in general, some women
when things go wrong in the divorce and you get a vindictive ex-wife, these things
happen.”
But there is no Charter right to be a bully. And now, thanks to the Intimate
Images and Cyber-protection Act, there can be real-life consequences for bad
behaviour online. There is an order of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia against
Ms. Dadas and Mr. Feser, and they may be ordered to pay damages to Ms.
Candelora.
In a recent interview, American lawyer Carrie Goldberg (an expert in the
non-consensual distribution of intimate images) called the court system ‘‘the
great equalizer” in responding to cases of online misconduct. 28 This is a useful
way to understand the New Act. The court’s role as referee in a social media fight
between adults may not seem as weighty as it would be in a complex commercial
dispute or constitutional case, but it is just as meaningful for someone whose life
has been turned upside down by online harassment.
Courts are used to being arbiters of messy disputes — and making sense of
the messiness. The Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act is a new way for the
courts to do what they have always done: provide access to justice for those who
may not have anywhere else to turn.
27

28

It is still expected that most cases will be resolved informally ‘‘with the help of the
CyberSCAN Unit at the Department of Justice”: see Supreme Court of Nova Scotia,
Practice Memorandum No. 13: Intimate Images and Cyber-Protection (22 June 2018),
online: <https://www.courts.ns.ca/Civil_Procedure_Rules/cpr_practice_memos/
PM13_Intimate_Images_Cyberprotection.htm#PM13>.
Michel Martin, ‘‘‘This Isn’t Speech’: Attorney Carrie Goldberg on Revenge Porn” NPR
(16 November 2019), online: <https://www.npr.org/2019/11/16/779720295/this-isntspeech-attorney-carrie-goldberg-on-revenge-porn>.

